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ABSTRACT
This paper examines issues of household saving, growth, and aging in
Taiwan. The Taiwanese patterns of high income growth, declines in fertility,
and increases in life expectancy all have implications for life-cycle saving. We
use data from fifteen consecutive household income and expenditure surveys,
from 1976 to 1990, to examine whether observed profiles of consumption and
saving are consistent with life-cycle theory. The patterns of consumption and
saving across households of different ages and cohorts appear to be broadly
consistent with a life-cycle model. However, the data also indicate that
household consumption tracks income closely, and this evidence casts doubt on
simple life-cycle theory.
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and NBER0. Introduction
This paper examines issues of life-cyclesaving, growth and aging in
Taiwan. We are mainly concerned with standardissues of life-cycle
saving, and their implications for the living standards of theelderly. We
investigate whether saving appears to be motivatedby life-cycle factors,
how income growth has affected theprofiles of income, consumption
and saving, and how changes in thedemographic structure of Taiwan
have influenced saving behavior. Weuse data from fifteen consecutive
household income and expendituresurveys, from 1976 through 1990.
Although there is no panel element to these data, the large numberof
households surveyed (approximately 14,000per year) and the large
number of cross-sections allows us to track cohorts ofpeople through
time, and to observe the evolution of their levels of income,consump-
tion and saving.
Taiwan provides an excellent laboratory in whichto study the
determinants of household saving. First, as Table 1shows, the last four
decades have seen both very rapid growth andvery high saving rates.
The annual growth of GNPper capita averaged 4.3% in the 1950's,
7.0% in the 1970's and 6.7% in the 1980's, andalthough the oil price
shocks of the early 1970's and 1980's were associated withperiods of
relatively slow growth, there is no evidence thatper capita growth rates
are beginning to slow. Indeed, growth rates in the latter half of the
1980's exceeded any in the previous three decades. Thehigh saving
rates are also documented in Table 1. The National Accounts data show
that gross national saving as a fraction of GNP has increasedover the
past three decades, from an average of 18.7% between 1961 and 1965,
to over 32% in the years between 1976 and 1990. Householdsaving
represents a large fraction of national saving and the national accounts
1data show that roughly 50% of national saving is done by households,
even if we exclude the savings of private corporations. What is more,
the household survey data that we use yield savings figures that are of
comparable magnitude to those in the national accounts. This situation
stands in sharp contrast to that in many developing countries, where
survey data yield savings estimates that are much lower than those in
the national accounts.
The second feature of Taiwan that is relevant to life-cycle saving is
its rapid transition over the last several decades from high to low
population growth, see again Table 1. In the 1950's, Taiwan's rate of
population growth averaged 4.13% per year, reflecting the influx of
immigrants from mainland China and then a post-war baby boom. The
rate declined slowly through the early and middle 1960's, and fell
sharply in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The overall decline in the
rate of population growth masks two offsetting factors, both of which
are important to our topic. Life expectancy has increased and there has
been a sharp drop in fertility. In 1961, a sixty-year-old male had a life
expectation of 13.92 years. By 1990, this expectation had increased to
17.93 years, Republic of China (1991). For females, comparable
numbers are 17.85 and 20.51 years. The decline in population growth
rates despite these increases reflect the behavior of fertility, which
began to fall in the late 1960's. The Total Fertility Rate fell from 6.1
in 1958 to 1.9 in 1985. An important implication of this decline is that
Taiwanese who are currently young will, when old, have far fewer adult
children to provide potential support than do those who are old now.
In fact, the fraction of the elderly who live with their children is already
beginning to decline (see Lo, 1987), although this may be due more to
an increase in wealth that makes independent living possible, rather than
2a decline in the number of children who can potentially provide care.
High growth, declining fertility, and increasing life expectancy all
have consequences for saving that are predictable by standard life-cycle
theory, and it is these predictions that we examine in this paper. We
first investigate whether the observed patterns in consumption and
saving across different households can be fit into the life-cycle story. In
particular, we examine the basic implication of a life-cycle model that
savings should (at least eventually) decline with age. We also examine
cohort effects in consumption and in saving. Those who are currently
young in Taiwan have life-time earnings that are many times larger than
those of their parents and grandparents, and we test whether their
consumption profiles are shifted in the appropriate way. We also look
for the increased saving rates among the younger cohorts that might be
expected in the face of rising life expectancy and falling numbers of
children. We find reasonable conformity been the Taiwanese facts and
the life-cycle theory; it is certainly possible to interpret the broad
features of the data in life-cycle terms.
We also look at the familiar implications of the life-cycle model for
the relationship between savings and productivity growth. High income
growth across cohorts should yield high national savings rates, because
younger savers have a much higher lifetime wealth level than do older
dissavers, a mechanism that links growth to saving at the aggregate, but
not at the individual level. We find strong evidence of a link between
growth and saving at the individual level, something that is not
predicted by the theory. We also run a battery of standard excess
sensitivity tests, which do not provide any evidence against the life-
cycle story. Even so, we find a very marked coherence between the age
profiles of consumption and income for different cohorts, a coherence
3that is consistent with the life-cycle, but strongly suggests a more direct
link between consumption and income. We find it hard to rationalize
such a relationship in the Taiwanese context, so that the life-cycle
model remains perhaps the most satisfactory account of our evidence.
1. The Survey Data
The data used in this paper come from a time series of household
surveys, the Personal Income DistributionSurveys, collectedin the
Taiwan area of the Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan for short, in
the fifteen calendar years 1976 through 1990. In 1976 and 1977, the
sample sizes are a little over 9,000households,but from 1978 there are
over 14,000 households in each survey. The number of persons covered
varies from around 50,000 in the first two years to around 75,000 later.
New samples are drawn each year, so that it is not possible to track
individual households over time; instead, we shall track individual age
cohorts through the successive surveys.
The survey design is described in Republic of China (1989). For
income and consumption, data are collected both from interviews and
from diaries. At the single interview, questions are asked about major
items of income and expenditure in the past year, while the diaries,
maintained throughout the year and regularly inspected by field workers,
keep track of all items of income and expenditure. Only a "small
number of households" keep the diaries; these households are also
interviewed, and the results of comparing the two methods are "used to
check and/or correct results of all interviews in the survey." The survey
is a comprehensive one, and collects information on household struct-
ure, on socioeconomic characteristics (including industry, occupation,
and education), on household expenditures in some detail, and on the
4incomes by source of the household and of each of its members.
Information on assets is also collected, although we make no use of it
in this paper.
Our impression from the work that we have done and from the
results reported below is that the data are of good quality. One of the
attractions of working with data from a high saving country is the
ability to study saving at the household level. For many developing
countries, it is difficult to find much reported saving in household
survey data, even in those cases where national accounts data indicate
that households as a whole are saving substantial amounts, see for
example Visaria (1982) for several Asian countries, Paxson (1992) for
Thailand, and Deaton (1992) for Côte d'Ivoire. The Taiwanese survey
data do not have this problem, and the high national saving rates are
reflected in the behavior of the individual households. Table I shows
that, according to the national accounts, saving by households has
varied around 20% of household income since 1975, while the figures
from the surveys, although far from identical, are of the same order of
magnitude. Given that saving is the difference between two large
magnitudes, each estimated with error, given that the coverage of the
surveys and the national accounts is different, and given the difficulties
that are typically encountered in reconciling household and national
accounts, we view the correspondence as remarkably close. For
household incomes, which are also shown in Table 1, the survey data
are again close to those from the national accounts, with a maximum
discrepancy of five percent.
Since we shall be concerned with saving within a life-cycle context,
it is useful to look first at the demographic information in the surveys.
Figures 1 show the age-sex pyramids for each of the survey years; as
5with all of the summary statistics presented in the paper, numbers are
weighted by the appropriate inflation factors so as to provide estimates
of the underlying population. No inflation factors are available for the
first two years, 1976 and 1977, for which the results are presented in
unweighted form; evidence from the other years suggests that the
unweighted data are unlikely to be misleading.
Note first that the surveys evidently fail to capture a substantial
number of young males aged between 20 and 25, presumably those in
college or engaged in military service. In the last few years, from 1988
through 1990, a similar phenomenon is beginning to be evident for
young females over a somewhat broader age range. This may again be
related to college, and indeed more than half of college students in
Taiwan are women; it may also reflect employment patterns among
young women. In any case, these people, both male and female, are
'missing' as a result of the survey design, and not because of any
similar feature in the population.
Another feature of these survey demographics reflects a genuine
peculiarity of the Taiwanese population. In all years, there is an excess
of middle-aged to older men over women in the same age group, see
the sex ratios by age in Figure 2. In the first year, 1976, the number of
males per 100 females is greater than 100 over the range from 40
through 65 years of age, reaching a peak of 140 at age 50.Thispeak
ages one year per year, and by 1990, there are somewhat less than 140
65 year-old males for each 65 year old female. These numbers are a
consequence of the cohort of predominantly male 'mainlanders' who
came to Taiwan in 1949, and an unusually large fraction of whom have
never married. These people differ in a number of other respects from
the rest of the population, for example,many were soldiers, and a high
6proportion have government pensions (or pension rights), and so
provide a group whose life-cycle consumption and saving behavior can
be expected to differ from other Taiwanese.
The changing shapes of the pyramids also showsvery clearly the
marked (and remarkable) aging of the population over the fifteenyear
period of our sample. Figure 3 shows, for each year, the fractions of the
population older than each age. In 1976, .046 of the population were
over 60; in 1990, the fraction was .092.. The ratio of the elderly to their
surviving children, although still high because of older fertility rates,
will fall rapidly over time. For example, Hermalin, Ofstedal, and Li
(1991) indicate that women aged 61-65 in 1990 had, on average, 5.1
children ever born in their lifetimes. The number of children ever born
is expected to drop to 3.6 for those aged 46-50 in 1990, and to 2.4 for
those aged 3 1-35 in 1990. Although numbers of children ever born is
not the same as children surviving into their parent's oldage, the
evidence strongly suggests that many of the current generation ofyoung
adults cannot expect to avail themselves of the traditional Chinese
pattern whereby elderly parents move into their son's home. This idea
is supported by survey evidence from Chang (1987), which indicates
that a growing fraction of currentlyyoung Taiwanese women do not
expect to live with their sons when they are old.Absent state
intervention in the form of social security (and although social security
is being expanded in Taiwan, the coverage and amounts are stillvery
small), the current generation of young workers has a strong incentive
to save a larger fraction of their incomes than did their parents. One of
our aims in this paper is to see if we can find evidence of such an
increase in life-cycle saving among the young, and whether it can
plausibly be attributed to the effects of the demographic transition.
72. Constructing cohorts
For most of the interesting questions about saving and the life-cycle, it
is necessary to track individuals over time, and to observe the changes
in consumption, income, and saving as people age. Although we cannot
track individual households in the data, we can track 'cohorts' of
households, with cohorts defined according to their year of birth. For
each year of data, we average the variables of interest by age of
individuals or age of household head, and then track, not the same
individuals, but the sample from the same cohort one year older in the
next survey. In this way, we can follow cohort means for fifteen years
for each age cohort of households or individuals. We do this both at the
level of the household, with age defined by the age of the head, and at
the level of the person, again using age as the grouping variable. Where
we have individual data, for example on earnings, the (sample
weighted) cohort means of individuals by age provide unbiased
estimates of mean earnings for the underlying population of that age.
For other variables, which can be collected only at the household level,
matters are a good deal less clear. Avenging by the age of the
household head has the inevitable effect of confounding genuine
changes in stable households with changes in both household formation
and in headship. For example, since earnings (eventually) decline with
age, and since older men cease (by definition in these data) to be heads
when they cease to be the main earner, households with older heads will
be an increasingly selected sample of the population, and will therefore
display behavior that increasingly disguises actual patterns of household
change over time. For example, households with older heads will be
those whose head has unusually high earnings compared with others of
his or her cohort, or those who have an unusual amount of wealth that
8enables the household to survive as an independent unit.As a
consequence,and if,for argument'ssake, savings rates arepositively
correlatedwith earnings, or are positively correlated with wealth
(households whoare predisposed to savearetypically richerthanthose
whoare not), we may observe that, at high ages, household saving rates
increase with the age of the head even though assets are typically being
rundownin old age.
The alternative, of averaging•over individuals by age, although
minimizingselectivity, isdifficult,becauseso many variables are
reportedonly at the household level,so thatwe have to impute
individualconsumptionor incomes based on those of the household to
whichtheybelong.Old peoplewholive with their children are therefore
attributedsomefraction ofhousehold incomeorconsumption,an
attributionthat is essentially arbitrary when there is noinformation
about intrahousehold allocation. These problemsarenot soluble, and
theyhavetobe keptcontinuouslyinmind wheninterpreting the results
presented below.
Table2 reports the numbersof householdsin five selected household
cohorts for each year of the survey data; Table3records the same
information forthenumbers ofpeople inthe 'individual' cohorts. To
save space, we show numbersfor only fivecohorts, but we have
constructed (and will use) the cohorts at each age, although in some
cases it will be necessary to eliminate the youngest and the oldest
groups. In total, the data allowusto calculate 1,031 head's age/year
pairsfor thehousehold data, and1,161age/year pairs fortheindividual
data; only 75 of these areshownin each table. Cohorts are defined by
year ofbirth,ormore conveniently,byage in 1976. Hence,thefirst
columnof Table2shows the sample representation of households
9headed by those born in1956,who were 20 in 1976, and 34 in 1990.
Theincrease in numbers, from 26 households in 1976 to 640
households in 1990, shows not that the cohort of those born in 1956 is
increasing, nor that the sample is incorrectly drawn, but that 34 year
olds are much more likely to be household heads than 20 year olds. For
the older cohorts, the variation in sample size is much less, and it is
these middle years of household headship for which the averages are
likely to be both most accurate, because there are more households in
each average, and because selection problems are less severe.
Figure 4 shows how the cohort grouping can be used to show both
the life-cycle pattern of family formation and the cohort effects of
falling fertility. The age of the head of the household is plotted on the
horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows the average number of
children in the household, children here defined according to the official
survey definition, which is 20 years old or younger. The plotted points
are connected when we are following the same cohort through time, but
different cohorts are left unconnected. To avoid complete clutter, we
show only every fifth cohort, so that the first line segment on the left-
hand side of the figure shows the number of children in households
headed by those who were 20 in 1976; by the time these people are 35
in1990, they are well launched into their child-rearing years, and have
a little under 2 children per household. The second cohort, the 25 year-
olds in 1976, overlap with the first cohort for 10 years, but take us
another five years into the life-cycle, since these people are 40 in the
last 1990 survey. To the extent that these two cohorts and the next one
overlap, the profiles of children by age have similar shapes, with the
maximum number of children attained around age 40, and falling
thereafter, as the oldest leave home, and new children cease to be born.
l0However, the falling fertility showsup in the profiles as pronounced
vertical shifts, or cohort effects, as we move fromone cohort to the
next.
One way of turning these pictures into numbers isto fit to these
means a polynomial in age together with a series of cohort dummies,
one for each date of birth. For Figure 4, we do this only for those older
than 19 and younger than 61, so as to exclude those cohorts wherethere
are few individuals in the means. The estimated cohort effects show
that, apart from the first five groups, aged 20—24 in 1976, and whichwe
know to be unreliable both because of thesample design and because
of selectivity, there is anaverage decline of 0.06 children per year, so
over the 35yearage span, from heads aged 25 to heads aged 60, there
has been a decline in numbers of childrenper household of 2.3, from
4.71 to 2.44 at the maximum of the profile. Ofcourse, this measure is
neither a measure of the decline in childrenever born, nor of children
available to parents in old age, but it neverthelessseems likely that for
those in their mid-thirties now, there will beonly half as many sons to
look after them in old-age as there are now for those whoare seventy
years old.
The demographic transition is one remarkable fact aboutmodern
Taiwan; another is its rate of economic growth, and the effectson the
earnings of the different cohorts. Figure 5,whichis constructed for
individuals and not for households, shows the cohortearnings patterns
for every fifth cohort, again starting with those who were 20years old
in 1976. Again we can make out the usualpattern of earnings with age,
but superimposed is very rapid within-cohort growth, at least forsome
of the cohorts. For those aged 25 in 1976, realearnings have grown at
the astonishing rate of 12%per year over the fifteen years since. For
Iiolder cohorts, the amount is less, falling with age and eventually
becoming negative for the cohort aged 50 in 1976. The bias of earnings
growth towards theyoungis plausibly attributable to the much higher
levels of education among young cohorts, and is consistent with
evidence from the United States, where earnings functions frequently
show a positive interaction between education and experience. In the
U.S., much of the growth in earnings among the young is associated
with job changes, and with the greater tendency of young workers to
move from one job to another. The same phenomenon might well hold
true in Taiwan, with young people moving into the new jobs created by
the rapid rate of economic growth.
Figure 6 shows non-labor income by age and by cohort. In a country
with savings rates as high as those in Taiwan, total income behaves
very differently from earnings, and the figure shows how asset income
and transfers replace earnings with age, so that total income does not
collapse with age nearly as rapidly as does earnings. Lo (1987)
provides more detail on the composition of income of the elderly, and
how it has changed over time.
3. A life-cycle interpretation of consumption and saving
With the demographic and earnings environment described, we turn to
consumption behavior, and the extent to which it fits the standard life-
cycle framework. We are particularly concerned with whether Taiwan's
high saving ratio can be attributed to its high rate of growth through the
traditional life-cycle mechanism, with younger, richer cohorts, being
responsible for the bulk of the saving. We also want to look for traces
of the demographic transition in the behavior of younger cohorts, and
in particular whether they are saving not just large amounts because
12their earnings are high, but are actually saving at a higher rate than their
predecessors.
The cohort data are ideally suited for examining these issues. There
are a large number of cohorts, with younger cohorts very much richer
in life-time resources than their parents or grandparents. Even at 10%
per annum real earnings growth, which is less than the 12% average
experienced by the younger cohorts, 25 year olds in Taiwan can expect
real lifetime earnings that are nearly 11 times greater than those of 50
year olds. At the same time, since the data run for fifteen consecutive
years, we observe behavior at the same age for a range of different
cohorts, so that it is possible to separate cohort (wealth) effects from
age (preference) effects. Indeed, as we shall show below, it is even
possible to say something about the effects of common macroeconomic
shocks, as represented by year effects.
With no income uncertainty, the life cycle model predicts that
consumption is a function of lifetime resources (earnings plus inherited
assets), with the fraction of resources consumed being a function of age,
as dictated by preferences and the life-cycle variation in household size
and composition. We write
c= g(a)W (1)
whereW is the sum of assets and the discounted present value of
current and expected future labor income, and g(a)issome function of
age a. Taking logs, we have
Inc =lng(a)+InW (2)
This equation holds at the level of the individual, but given its additive
structure, it can be averaged over all households of the same age (as
13defined by head's age) in each year, so that the average of the
logarithms of consumption for each age/year combination should be
additively decomposable into a wealth term, which is constant within
cohorts, and an age term. Equation (2) can then be estimated non-
parametrically using the cohort data, by regressing the cohort averages
of the logarithm of consumption against cohort dummies and age
dummies.
The raw data on total household consumption are plotted in Figure
7 in the same format as the earlier cohort diagrams; the figure shows
the average of consumption, although it is the average of log consump-
tion that will be used in the regressions. (Similar pictures for consump-
tion per head, or consumption per adult equivalent, for various
definitions of the latter, give very similar results.) Figure 7 shows a
remarkable resemblance to Figure 5, for earnings, a resemblance that
will be explored further in the next section. Note again that, while there
is a distinctly visible life-cycle pattern to consumption, rising with age
and then falling, there is also a great deal of within cohort consumption
growth, especially for the younger cohorts. Clearly, old and young
households are not sufficiently altruistically linked for their consumption
to move in lockstep.
The results can be given an explicit life-cycle interpretation by
estimating equation (2), and the results are given, not in numerical form,
since there are 66 cohort effects and 51 age effects, but graphically in
Figure 8, where cohort effects (age in 1976) and age effects are shown
together. In the left hand ligure, (2) is estimated with age and cohort
dummies only, while in the right hand graph, we show the age and
cohort effects when the (average) numbers of adults and children are
added as additional regressors. (Additional adults markedly increase
14consumption, additional children have little effect.) As predicted by the
life-cycle model for a growing economy, the cohort effects decline
steadily from younger to older cohorts; both graphs show that, at the
same age, consumption increases at about 4% per cohort, so that, for
example, the consumption at age 40 of someone born in 1950 is on
average 3.4 times larger than the consumption at age of 40 of someone
born in 1925. As is to be expected, theage effects depend to some
extent on whether or not the household composition variables are
explicitly included in the regressions. In either case, theage profile is
much steeper than is typically seen in the US or even in other LDC's,
flattening out only very gradually with age. In both panels, consumption
falls with age only after age 60, although the decline is lesspronounced
in the right hand panel where we control for the numbers of household
members. Note again, however, that the selection effects should make
as very skeptical about conclusions for households with elderly heads.
While steep age-consumption profiles are unusual, they arecertainly not
inconsistent with the life-cycle model. In aneconomy growing as
rapidly as Taiwan, real interest rates are very high, especially in the
large and rapidly developing small business sector, so that there are
strong intertemporal incentives to postpone consumption and for
consumption to grow rapidly over time. Alternatively, it is possible that
Taiwanese are more patient than most other people, or that the Chinese
veneration for the elderly extends to a perceived high marginal utility
of consumption in old age.
-
Onefeature of Figure 7 is not accounted for by either theage or
cohort effects in Figure 8. This is the fact that the individual cohort
'tracks' have similar shapes, so that, for example, almost all show a
decline in consumption with age between the fourth and fifth observa-
15tions. These are clearly caused by the presence of macroeconomic
effects that impinge on all cohorts to a greater or less degree, butwhich
are located in real time, and which cannotbe explained by cohort or age
effects. The obvious extension to equation (2) is to allow for fixed year
effects, so that the consumption equation becomes
lflCat= lng(a)+InW+O, (3)
where O is a year fixed effect, and the suffices a, b,andtdenoteage,
cohort, and time respectively. Note that given age and time, cohortis
determined; indeed we have been measuring b as age in 1976, which is
a —t+1976.
Equation (2) is an implication of the life-cycle model of consumption
when there is no uncertainty, so that cohort wealth levels are never revi-
sed. Once uncertainty is admitted, wealth levels will be revised in res-
ponse to macroeconomic shocks, so that the life-cyclemodel with un-
certainty provides at least some basis for (3). However, the link between
(3) and the model under uncertainty is not as clean as was the link with
(2) under certainty, since the effects of a common macroeconomic
shock on wealth levels ought to vary with age. While it is possible in
principle to include interaction terms between year and cohort effects,
unrestricted estimation would not be possible even with the current data.
Nevertheless, the year effects are certainly present in the data, and it
seems useful to estimate (3) as an approximation to the more general
model, if only to ensure that the failure to accommodate the year effects
does not contaminate the estimates of the age and cohort effects, with
which the year dummies are strongly correlated.
The estimation of (3) requires some thought about the relationship
16between age, cohort, and year dummies. Write C, Y, and A for matrices
of dummy variables of cohort, year, and age dummies; each matrix has
1031 rows, the number of yearlhead's age pairs, while the numbers of
columns are 65 for cohorts (for those aged 11 in 1976 to those aged 75
in 1976), 15 for years, and 51 for ages, from age 25 to age 75. Note
that we have truncated on age of head, eliminating those below 25 to
avoid the 'missing' males below that age group, and above 75 to elimi-
nate the very imprecisely estimated cohort means from households with
very old heads. Of course, there are no heads of households in 1976
who were then 11 years old, but we do include one observation on that
cohort,when theyare 25 year-old heads of household in 1990. Equation
(3) can be rewritten in terms of the dummy variable matrices as
lnc0,=t13+Cy÷Aa÷Yiy+e (4)
wheret is a vector of units, and the vectors a, y, and w are parameters
ofage,cohort, and year effects. As usual, one category from each set
ofdummiesmust be excluded, and doing so presents no non-standard
issues of interpretation. However, the dependency between age, cohort,
and year introduces a slightly less standard complication.
Let denote the (transpose of the) vector (1,2,3,ii). Then,
since cohort is age minus year plus a constant, the matrices of dummy
variables satisfy the exact linear relationship
Ca = As - + (5)
where n, no, andare the numbers of cohorts, ages, and years. To see
that the constant term in (5) equals it,., note that the youngest cohort of
17people (aged 111 in 1976) will be the youngest age of 25 in theyear.
As a result of the identity expressed by (5), the parameters in (4) are




- - (6) y=y+ica;
and Kissome arbitrary non-zero scalar, then, as is easily checked by
substitution into (4), there is no consequence for the predicted value of
consumption. The way that this works caii readily be seen from the
original cohort-consumption plots in Figure 7. For the first cohort, sup-
pose that there is no cohort effect, so that the first trace is the sum of
age and year effects. Since the cohort ages one year at a time, adding
equal amounts to year and age dummies will leave the trace unchanged.
The trace for the second cohort starts from the same year but one year
of age younger, so that the second trace will also be left unchanged if
the second cohort effect is incremented by one, and so on through the
cohorts according to (6). In effect, any trend in the data can be arbi-
trarily reinterpreted as a year trend, or (since year equals age minus
cohort plus a constant) as trends in ages and cohorts that are equal but
of opposite sign. However, it is clear that the appropriate normalization
is to require that the year effects sum to zero. As an example, consider
a hypothetical case in which there are apparently no cohort or age
effects, but where the logarithm of consumption increases by y per
annum for all age groups. Consider what the cohort diagram Figure 6
would look like in such a case. Each cohort trace would increase byV
per year of age, but each cohort trace would start at the same horizontal
18level as the previous one, or equivalently, at a vertical shift of iybelow
it. A steady growth in year effects simply means that consumption is
growing with age and declining with cohort, and it is appropriate to
attribute the effects to age and cohort, not time.
In the light of this discussion, we estimate equation (4) with the first
age group, and the fifteenth cohort omitted, so that the reference group
is that for a household headed by a 25 year-old in 1976. The fifteen
year dummies are constrained to be orthogonal to a time trend, and to
add to zero. The 'base year' is thus a timeless average of all years, and
any time trend is attributed to cohorts and ages, not to time.
The points shown as diamonds in Figure 9 show the resulting age,
cohort, and year effects, with (in the bottom panel) and without (in the
top panel) the addition of the average adult and children variables. The
figures also show the same decomposition for the average of the logari-
thms of total income (earnings plus asset and other income) and shown
as squares, and for the 'saving ratio,' measured here as the difference
of the logarithms of income and consumption, and shown as crosses.
(For Taiwanese saving ratios, the approximation is not particularly accu-
rate, but the logarithmic form is convenient, given that we are working
with the logarithms of income and consumption.) The consumption pro-
files are not markedly different from those in the previous figure, even
though the year effects are quite significant, with an associated F-value
of 59.8inthe basic model and 81.5 in the model with adults and child-
ren. The corresponding F-values for age and cohort effects are 408.8
and 373.1, respectively, in the basic model, and 437.0 and 60.4 in the
extended model, and it is these effects that are our primary concern in
examining life-cycle behavior. Conditional on cohort and age effects,
adults increase income by about as much as they increase consumption,
19and have little effect on household saving, while children decrease
income with little effect on consumption, and so decrease saving.
The cohort effects are larger the younger the cohort for consumption,
for income, and for the saving ratio, so that, at the same age, those born
later in calendar time are saving a higher fraction of their incomes. This
is exactly what we might expect from the life-cycle model in the
Chinese context in the face of rapidly declining fertility and rapidly
rising life-expectancy. Although the cohort differences in saving ratios
are too large to be plausible in the model without the addition of
numbers of adults and children, the extended model shows a flatter
profile of savings rates across cohorts. For example, the saving cohort
effects in the second figure in the bottom panel show a difference of -
0.23in ln(ylc)betweenthe cohort aged 11 in 1976 (aged 25 in 1990)
and the cohort 35 years older, aged 60 in 1990. The average value of
ln(y/c)in1990 for households headed by 25 year olds was 0.276, a
saving rate of 24%, so that the model predicts a saving rate of a 4.5%
for the older cohort at the same age, i.e. in 1955. As we saw above, this
is exactly the comparison group for which the number of children has
fallen by a half, and the increase in the saving rate is perhaps ofthe
order of magnitude required to replace family by autarkic old-age
insurance.
The age effects in the left hand panels are also not obviously
consistent with the life-cycle story. The rising age-profile of consump-
tion is matched by an even more rapidly rising age pattern of income,
so that the saving rate, instead of being positive at young ages, and
negative later, shows a steady increase with age. If such a result is
correct, an increase in the rate of growth of productivity would
decrease, not increase aggregate saving, since it would redistribute
20income towards the young, who have the lowest saving propensity, at
least provided cohort effects are eliminated, as would be expected when
the demographic transition is complete. However, it is quite likely that
the age effects on saving are contaminated by the selection processes for
headship, certainly at old ages, and perhaps also at young ages. As
already discussed, it is entirely plausible that those households headed
by older people are those with an unusually high propensity to save, so
that the right hand panels in the Figure are revealing only the selection
effects, and not the true patterns of saving ratios. Nor can this problem
be resolved by switching from a household to an individual basis, as is
done in Figure 10, which repeats Figure 9, but with averages taken over
individuals, not households. The problem is that here we are still
looking at house/told incomes, consumption, and saving, only the
household magnitudes have been attributed to individuals. The age
effects on saving are now even more extreme, because the old individu-
als on the right of the diagram are now predominately located in
households headed by younger adults, so that we lose the flattening of
income, consumption, and savings profiles with age that is observed in
the household level data.
Our results can thus be interpreted in terms of a more-or-less
standard life-cycle model, at least provided we are allowed to choose a
desired consumption profile that rises rapidly with age, which indeed is
theoretically plausible in the circumstances. Saving rates are system-
atically higher for the younger cohorts, and the effect is consistent with
the increased need to provide for old age. And if we fail to observe any
life-cycle profile in saving rates by age, there are statistical grounds that
can perhaps explain what we see.
21S. Alternative explanations: tracking and growth
The ability to give a life-cycle interpretation to the data does not
mean that the life-cycle is in fact correct, and in this section we look at
some more negative evidence. In particular, we consider whether there
is evidence in these data that consumption 'tracks' income by more than
would be expected if the life-cycle model is correct, and we look more
closely at the relationship between saving and growth.
Tracking has been found in other data, see particularly Carroll and
Summers (1990) for the United States, and Deaton (1992) for Thailand
and Côte d'Ivoire. However, in all these examples, the large mass of
households accumulate little or nothing, and saving is used to buffer
short term fluctuations in income; in the absence of accumulation,
consumption and income must move together in the long run. However,
there is certainly no lack of accumulation by households in Taiwan, so
that we should expect to observe a greater decoupling of consumption
and income, even over long life-cycle spans. Taiwanese households
have demonstrated their ability to accumulate enough assets to
accomplish even 'low frequency' consumption smoothing. Although the
evidence in the previous section is consistent with the life-cycle story,
it does not immediately follow that much long-term smoothing is being
done, since the preferred profile of consumption may not call for it. It
is therefore necessary to look at the data in a different way.
Figure 11 shows the same data on consumption and income by age
as in Figure 5, but with a separate diagram for each cohort, and with
income and consumption shown together. Once again, we see the
marked differences in the shape of the profile between the younger and
older cohorts, with much more rapid growth for younger households.
We also see the growing saving ratio as a widening between consump-
22don and income over time. Butthe mostmarked feature of Figure 11
is the extraordinary coherence between, the patterns of consumption and
income for each of the cohorts. The shape of each changes with age, but
they change together, with consumption tracking income, year by year,
and age by age. Such a picture suggests a crude Keynesian consumption
function, with consumption strongly linked to income. And yet we have
seen in the previous section that the data, which are the same as those
used here, are consistent with a life-cycle interpretation. The key to the
reconciliation is the fact that in the earlier analysis, in Figure 9, the
cohort effects, the age effects, and the year effects, have very similar
shapes, across cohorts, age, and time, for both consumption and income.
While this is consistent with the life-cycle model, only the coherence
between income shocks and consumption shocks is directly predicted by
it, although it could also be argued that in a rapidly growing economy,
real returns will be high, so that optimal intertemporal planning should
generate rapid consumption growth to match rapid income growth. Even
so, Figure 1 1 is strongly suggestive of some simpler model embodying
a much more direct link between consumption and income. That said,
it is no simple matter to think of a coherent alternative. Liquidity
constraints make very little sense in an environment in which so many
people are saving so much. Nor do buffering models seem relevant
here, whether with borrowing constraints as in Deaton (1991), or with
precautionary saving and large shocks, as in Carroll (1992). Both of
these models work by supposing that people generally wish to accumu-
late little or nothing, but use saving to buffer consumption against short-
term fluctuations in income. For such people, consumption tracks in-
come because, in the long run, consumption is identical to income. That
is not the case here. Perhaps the life-cycle model still provides the best
23theoretically consistent account of the facts.
Before accepting that position, consider the positive relationship
between saving and growth, perhaps the most celebrated prediction of
the life-cycle model. We have already seen that the estimated models
do not clearly support this prediction in the Taiwanese case, since the
saving rate appears to increase with age, although we cannot use this to
reject the model because of the increasing selection of household heads
with age. Even so, the fact that there is a connection between saving
and growth seems hard to dispute. Taiwan, like Korea, Japan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore, are among the most rapidly growing and highest
saving economies in the world, and the cross country relationship
between saving and growth has been repeatedly documented. Further-
more, the productivity slowdown in the OECD countries has been
accompanied by a reduction in national saving ratios, essentially without
exception, see Modigliani (1991). However, there is still far from
general acceptance that the mechanism is that of the life-cycle model,
whereby slower growth redistributes national income away from
younger, saving cohorts1 to their lower saving or dissaving elders.
Indeed, for the United States, Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991)
have undertaken the very difficult task of interpreting the time-series
evidence from the various Consumer Expenditure Surveys, and have
provided strong evidence that the decline in saving in the U.S. has been
a decline that has affected all age groups; it is not the aggregation
phenomenon that the life-cycle model requires. This evidence suggests
that there is a mechanism linking growth and saving within cohorts, and
it is this possibility in Taiwan to which we now turn.
The top panel of Table 4 shows regressions of the 'saving rate'
(defined as before by the logarithm of the ratio of total income to
24consumption) against growth rates of earnings. These are run on the
same averaged data displayed in the household diagrams above, with
each observation corresponding to an age/year pair, and once again
include only ages from 25 through 75. As appropriate, averages are
averages of the logarithms of the underlying household data, not the
logarithms of averages, and all regressions are weighted by (the square
root of) the number of households in the cohort average. The regression
of the saving rate on the current rate of change of earnings, i.e. the
growth of current earnings over last period's earnings, is notshown;it
produces a strong positive coefficient, but such a result tells us little,
since measurement error will induce a positive correlation between
current saving and current income. Instead, the first line shows the
regression of the saving rate on the first four lags of earnings growth;
all the coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero.
The second line explores the possibility that the relationship is between
saving and current earnings growth, but using instrumental variables
estimation to purge the measurement error. Since measurement error
will induce a spurious correlation between successive lags of earnings
growth, we use only the second and third lags as instruments. This
regression shows no relationship between the saving rate and predictable
earnings growth, and the overidentification tests rejects the hypothesis
that lagged growth rates affect saving rates only through their ability to
predict current growth. (Indeed they have little ability to predict current
earning growth.)
The rest of the top paneL explores the same regressions but with the
addition first of cohort dummies, then of cohort and age dummies, and
finally of cohort, age, and year dummies. Given the relationships that
exist between earnings growth, age, and cohorts, we would argue for
25including these dummies, but for excluding the year dummies, since the
latter should be subsumed in the effects for which we are testing.
Although the coefficients are smaller than in the first row, the positive
association between lagged growth of earnings and saving rates remains,
at least until the year effects are introduced. None of the results suggest
that the effect is working through anticipated earnings growth. These
results show a positive relationship between saving rates and growth, a
relationship that is not an aggregation effect, but holds for specific
cohorts over time. Tracking the same group of people as they age, we
find that their saving rate is higher in the years following rapid earnings
growth. Because this effect is from laggedearningsgrowth, it has
nothing to do with the standard response of saving to transitory income,
and it is not an effect that is predicted by life-cycle theory.
These effects of within-cohort growth on within-cohort savings are
a good deal smaller than those that are typically predicted from the
aggregation effects of life-cycle saving, or that are typically found in the
cross-country or long time-span evidence. Those findings, and again see
Modigliani (1991), typically show an effect of growth on savings of
about 2, so that a shift in earnings growth from 5% to 10% will
generate an increase of JO percentage points in the saving rate. If we
take the results from the third row of Table 4, the effect is 0.137, which
is less than a tenth of the typical cross country estimates. Even the first
row estimates, which condition on neither cohort nor age effects, add
up to only 0.33. Hence, while the within cohort growth effects are
present, and while they cast doubt on the life-cycle model, they
probably cannot account for a major share of the relationship between
saving and growth in Taiwan.
The second half of the panel reports similar regressions, but with the
26dependent variable the rate of growth of consumption. These correspond
closely to the standard 'excess sensitivity' tests in the macroeconomic
consumption literature, see for example Campbell and Mankiw (1991),
who look for a relationship between consumption growth and anticipat-
ed growth in labor income. The only difference between the top and
bottom panels, apart from the dependent variable, is that the first lag of
earnings growth is excluded from the unrestricted regression; if con-
sumption growth is correlated with unanticipated growth in earnings, as
the life-cycle supposes, and if earnings are mismeasured, there will be
a spurious correlation between consumption growth and lagged earnings
growth that does not contradict the model. The results provide no
evidence of excess sensitivity in Taiwan, although there are good
reasons to question the power of the test. Lagged earnings growth has
little predictive power for consumption growth in any of the regressions,
but it also has little predictive power for current earnings growth. With
little ability to anticipate earnings growth, we cannot tell whether the
component of earnings growth that might be anticipated is or is not cor-
related with changes in consumption.
6. Summary and conclusions
Where do these results leave us, and what is their implication for
saving in Taiwan, particularly for retirement saving in a rapidly aging
population? We have found it a good deal harder to find fault with the
life-cycle theory than we supposed would be the case. Although
consumption seems to move very closely with income, the Taiwanese
save a great deal, and the comovement can be explained in terms of
earnings shocks, which induce a short mn correlation between consump-
tion and income, together with a taste for rapid consumption growth
27with age, which itself might be attributed to the intertemporal incentives
generated by very high rates of return in a rapidly growing economy.
We also find that younger cohorts have higher saving rates, as is to be
expected given falling fertility and rising life-expectancy. If we accept
such a picture, we can attribute at least part of Taiwan's high saving
ratio to farsighted young consumers making preparation for a 'modern'
old-age in which they will be thrown on their own resources, rather than
on those of their married sons.
We are not entirely convinced that the picture is quite so simple,
although we have no really coherent alternative to offer. The life-cycle
explanation for the coherence between consumption and income seems
farfetched compared with some simpler and moreparsimonious story in
which consumption is directly linked to income, although we also
recognize that it is difficult to explain why people should behave in this
way, especially in a high saving economy where liquidity constraints are
unlikely to be a problem. There is certainly no evidence of excess
sensitivity in our results, though better and more powerful tests might
yield different results. We also found evidence that saving responds to
growth within cohorts, something that is consistent with the importance
of habits in consumption. Even so, the effect is not nearly as large as
that delivered by simple life-cycle stories, and is small compared with
other empirical evidence on the relationship. Our data do not show
dissaving or even decreased saving among older households; indeed the
estimated age effects in saving behavior increase steadily with age. Of
course we recognize that this evidence is severely contaminated by the
processes of household dissolution and combination as individuals age.
Nevertheless, such results are hardly overwhelming evidence in favor
of the life-cycle model.
28We therefore hesitate to endorse the position that the life-cycle model
is alive andwell, andliving in Taiwan, especially if such a position is
taken to imply that there is no need for public action to supplement
social security among those who will be old 25 years from now.
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 Table III: Numbers of households in selected household cohorts
cohort 1cohort 11cohort 21cohort 31cohort 41
age in 20 30 40 50 60
1976
Numbers ofhouseholdsinyear:-
1976 26 203 304 275 113
1977 35 274 280 237 71
1978 70 401 380 344 106
1979 133. 352 383 300 88
1980 188 393 359 329 82
1981 261 375 372 318 87
1982 363 372 370 327 74
1983 394 364 376 278 71
1984 463 410 347 237 70
1985 519 400 296 242 48
1986 543 398 303 222 53
1987 563 367 281 191 65
1988 604 390 260 208 49
1989 636 364 256 184 41
1990 640 299 228 196 59Table IV: Saving rates, consumption growth, and earnings growth
dine dlne•3 dlne2 dlny.3 dine4 OlD
F-test
saving rate regressions, lny — Inc
effects:
none 0.0793 0.1049 0.0888 0.0632
0.6995 (8.3) (9.2) (7.7) (5.8)
cohorts (1.6) 10.75
0.0302 0.0483 0.043! 0.0321
0.2150 (4.1) (5.5) (4.9) (3.9)
cohorts. (0.9) 10.36
ages 0.0187 0.0421 0.0430 0.0329
0.2881 (2.3) (4.1) (4.2) (3.5)
cohorts, (1.5) 3.09
ages. -0.0136 -0.0114 -0.0099 0.0075
years 0.0318 (1.7) (1.0) (0.9) (0.8)
(0.7) 0.56
consumption growth regressions, dlnc
none -ooiss -0.0116 0.0064
-0.0354 (1.8) (1.0) (0.6) 2.37
(0.3)
cohorts -0.0307 -0.0260 -0.0062
0.0552 (2.8) (2.2) (0.5) 4.80
(0.3)
cohorts, -0.0158 -0.0033 0.0260
ages 0.1510 (1.4) (0.3) (2.1) 4.16
(1.1)
cohorts, -0.0005 0.0024 0.0071
ages, 0.0258 (0.1) (0.2) (0.6) 0.03
years (0.4)
Notes: The regressions in the top panel have the cohortaverage of the individual saving rates'
ln(y/c) as the dependent variable, where y is total income and c is consumption. In the first
regression, In(jVc) is regressed on four lags of earnings growth dine; in the second, saving growth
is regressed on current earnings growth by instrumental variables, with the secondthrough fourth
lags of earnings growth as instnjrnents. The regressions are repeated with the inclusion of cohort
effects, cohort and age effects, and cohort, age, andyear effects. The bottom panel repeats the
regressions with consumption growth as the dependent variable. All consumption regressions, OLS
and lyE, exclude the first lag of earnings growth. All regressions include theaverage numbers of
adults and children, and all are weighted by thesquare root of the number of observations in each
cohort. When computing the cohortavenges of log earnings (used to construct earnings growth),
the few households with no earnings are assigneda value of earnings equal to one.Figure 1: Age-sex pyramids
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Figure6: Individual non-labor income, by age
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Figure 11: Consumption and income, by age of household head